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OPPORTUNITY LOST: IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS
OF SEXUAL AS SAUL T
A NOTE ON VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND CORPORATION V
GM
CHRISTINE FORSTER AND VEDNA JIVAN*
I INTRODUCTION
Five children, sexually abused by a perpetrator known to them, were recently
denied compensatory redress under the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act
1996 (NSW) (' VSRA ').1 The children were unsuccessful because the NSW Court
of Appeal held they had not provided evidence of their injuries. The case arose
out of the introduction of 'offence-based' sexual assault provisions into the New
South Wales criminal injuries compensation scheme.
The term 'offence-based' refers to an approach that primarily assesses the
amount of compensation on the basis of the criminal seriousness of the
perpetrator's conduct rather than the severity of the victim's injuries.' The
purpose of introducing an offence-based approach for this group of victims, this
note argues, was to reduce the arduous nature of the application process, thereby
signalling a timely recognition of the historical discrimination faced by victims
of sexual abuse in accessing the scheme. The inadequate drafting of the
provisions had however led to uncertainty amongst practitioners and academics
alike regarding the requirement to provide proof of injury. 3
Christine Forster, Law Faculty, University of NSW. Vedna Jivan, Law Faculty, University of
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Victims Compensation Fund Corpo ration v GM [2004] NSWCA 185 (Unreported, Mason P, Ipp JA,
McColl JA, 16 June 2004).
2 Peter Duff, 'The Measure of Criminal Injuries Compensation: Political Pragmatism or Dogs Dinner?'
(1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies lOS, 133.
3 See Christine Forster, 'Stolen Generations and the Victim's Compensation Tribunal: The Writing in of
Aboriginality to "Write Out" a Right to Compensatory Redress for Sexual Assault' (2002) 25(1)
University of New South Wales Law Journal 185; see also New South Wales Combined Community
Legal Centres, Submission to the Attorney General's Review of the VSRA 1996 and Victims Rights Act;
NSW Attorney-General's Department, Review of the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 and
the Victims Rights Act 1996 (2004) 42.
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The case of Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM4 ('GM) provided
the opportunity for the NSW Court of Appeal to resolve that uncertainty. This
note argues that while it was open for the Court of Appeal to concur with the
District Court that proof of injury had been removed by the new offence-based
provisions, the Court of Appeal did not. Instead, eschewing context and the
'social, economic and legal inequalities'S that had led to the introduction of the
sexual assault provisions, the Court of Appeal adopted a conservative approach
to their implementation. The Court could have considered, on the one hand,
relevant key Joint Select Committee Reports, basic tort law principles,llld
international conventions to which Australia is a signatory. On the other, it could
have considered a plethora of research revealing the devastating harm victims of
sexual abuse typically suffer- and the substantial body of literature highlighting
the historical and ongoing discrimination faced by victims of sexual abuse in
both the criminal justice system and the civil system.' However, preferring an
emphasis on statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeal held that the
requirement to provide proof of injury had not been removed by the offence-
based provisions. The Court of Appeal's decision, this note suggests, perpetuated
and enlarged the gap between the law and the realities and experiences of victims
of sexual abuse.
4 [2004] NSWCA 185 (Unreported, Mason P, Ipp JA, McColl JA, 16 June 2004).
5 See Diana Majury, 'Equality and Discrimination According to the Supreme Court of Canada' (1991) 4
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 407, 417 who argues that it is crucial to consider context ~ hen
interpreting any legal measure aimed at addressing inequality. See also Jenny Morgan, 'Equality Righs in
the Australian Context: A Feminist Assessment' in Philip Alston (ed), Towards an Australian Bi,1 of
Rights (1994), who similarly advocates a 'contextual' approach in the application of equality measures.
6 See generally Liz Tong, Kim Oates, Michael McDowell, 'Personality Development Following Sexual
Abuse' (1987) II Child Abuse and Neglect 371; Judith Cohen and Anthony Mannarino, 'Psychological
Symptoms in Sexually Abused Girls' (1988) 12 Child Abuse and Neglect 571; David Finkelhor e al,
'Sexual Abuse and its Relationship to Later Sexual Satisfaction, Marital Status, Religion and Attitudes'
(1989) 4 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 379; A J Einbender and William Friedrich, 'Psychological
Functioning and Behaviour of Sexually Abused Girls' (1989) 57 Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 155; Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror
(1992); Paul Mullen et al, 'The Effect of Child Sexual Abuse on Social, Interpersonal and Sexual
Function in Adult Life' (1994) 165 British Journal of Psychiatry 35; Mark Chaffin, John Wherry and
Roscoe Dykman, 'School Age Children's Coping with Sexual Abuse: Abuses, Stresses, and Symptoms
Associated with Four Coping Strategies' (1997) 21(2) Child Abuse and Neglect 227; Paul Mullen and
Jillian Fleming, 'Long Term Effects of Child Sexual Abuse' (1998) 9 Issues in Child Abuse Prevention
<http://www.aifs.gov/au/nch/issues9.html> at 6 November 2005; Jillian Fleming et al, 'The Long-Term
Impact of Childhood Sexual Abuse in Australian Women' (1999) 23 (2) Child Abuse and Neglect 145.
7 See Reg Graycar and Jenny Morgan, 'Disabling Citizenship: Civil Death for Women in the 1990s' (1995)
17 Adelaide Law Review 49; Luan Danaan, 'Justice Meets Mnemosyne: The Law and Women's
Memories of Child Sexual Assault' (1996) 7 Australian Feminist Law Journal 151; Sue Jarvis and Fiona
McIlwaine, 'Telling the Whole Story: Reports to the Crimes Compensation Tribunal' (1996) 7 Australian
Feminist Law Journal 145; Luan Danaan, 'Just Tokens? A Report on the Experience of Victim/Survivors
of Sexual Assault when Making Application for Crimes Compensation' (1997) 9 Australian Feminist
Law Journal 143; Ian Freckelton, 'Compensating the Sexually Abused' in Patricia Easteal (ed) Balanc'ng
the Scales. Rape, Law Reform and Australian Culture (1998) 19; Nick Mullany, 'Civil Actions for
Childhood Abuse in Australia' (1999) 115 The Law Quarterly Review 565; Nathalie Des Rosiers,
'Childhood Sexual Abuse and the Civil Courts' (1999) Tort Law Review 201; Julie Stubbs, 'Sexual
Assault, Criminal Justice and Law and Order' (2003) Practice and Prevention: Contemporary Issues in
Adult Sexual Assault in NSW <http://www.agd.nsw.gov.au/cpd.nsf/> at 6 November 2005.
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Part II provides an overview of the facts and procedural history of GM. Part III
maps the historical emergence of criminal injuries compensation schemes in New
South Wales. Part IV introduces the sexual assault provisions, the focus of this
paper. Part V examines the judicial interpretation of the VSRA by the District
Court and the Court of Appeal. Part VI critiques the Court of Appeal's decision
and considers alternate sources of interpretation including tort law and
international law. Finally, Part VII considers the implications of the Court of
Appeal's findings both for the five applicants and for other victims of sexual
assault.
II GM: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Five siblings were sexually abused by a family friend on numerous occasions.
The children were aged six, seven, seven, nine and ten at the time of the
disclosure of the offences. The perpetrator was initially charged with 11
'representative' counts of aggravated indecent assault, one count of aggravated
sexual assault, one count of aggravated indecency involving a victim under 16
under the authority of the perpetrator, and one count of common assault. The
perpetrator pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated indecent assault in
exchange for full discharge of the other charges. Subsequently, the parents of the
children lodged applications for compensation in the NSW Victims
Compensation Tribunal ('the Tribunal') on their behalf. To avoid retraumatising
the children, the parents chose not to subject them to psychiatric assessment and
did not submit medical evidence in support of the claims. The children's lawyers
argued that the VSRA provides that compensation for offences that fall within the
sexual assault provisions can be awarded without requiring medical or
testimonial evidence of injury. The Tribunal, in response, advised the children's
lawyers that proof of injury was required and requested medical evidence.
Subsequently, in the absence of medical evidence, the Tribunal refused all five
applications. An appeal to the Tribunal Member failed and the case proceeded on
appeal to the District Court." The successful outcome in the District Court was
appealed by the Tribunal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal.?
III A QUICK HISTORY OF CRIMINAL INJURIES
COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN NEW SOUTH WALES
Statute has provided victims of crime with an avenue of compensatory redress
in New South Wales since the beginning of the century. The history of statutory
compensation for victims of crime in New South Wales can loosely be grouped
into three main phases. In the first, the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900
(NSW) ('Crimes Act') made provision for judges to award compensation to
8 GM v Victims Compensation Fund (Unreported, Sidis J, 18 June 2003).
9 GM [2004] NSWCA 185 (Unreported, Mason P, Ipp JA, McColl JA, 16 June 2004).
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victims of crime which was paid out of the property of the convicted offender.'?
The rationale underpinning this phase of compensation was that offenders should
be responsible for recompensing victims for the injuries they have suffered. I I
However, this vehicle was unsatisfactory, in part, because the amounts that could
be awarded under the Crimes Act were modest and secondly because offenders
were often impecunious.'?
The second phase, beginning in 1967 saw the introduction of a state-funded
statutory scheme in New South Wales to compensate victims of crime." This
phase marked a significant shift away from placing total responsibility on the
perpetrator towards placing responsibility on the State for the injuries suffered by
victims of crime.!" It enabled victims to apply for an ex-gratia payment from
Consolidated Revenue if the perpetrator was impecunious or unable to be
identified." This development in the New South Wales jurisdiction followed a
wave of similar schemes that had been introduced in other countries." It e.lso
accompanied the creation of a number of other restorative schemes such as social
welfare benefits for single parents, the unemployed, the sick and the Iess-abled.!?
The change to a state-funded scheme can be situated within the emergence of the
welfare state" and the accompanying shift of the political ideology of the slate
towards a collective commitment to the caring for the well-being of citizens and
the collective good.'?
The third phase of statutory compensation for victims of crime in New Sorth
Wales began in 1993, after the Brahe Report'? was tabled in the New S011th
Wales Parliament detailing the shortfalls of the existing scheme. It suggested the
scheme be improved to ensure that claims for compensation are determined
'efficiently and with sensitivity' and made a number of recommendations." In
response to the Brahe Report, the New South Wales scheme underwent
significant changes. The primary change was the shift to a tariff approach of
10 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 437(1).
II Ian Freckelton, Criminal Injuries Compensation: Law, Practice and Policy (200 I) 32.
12 See Paul Fairall, 'Criminal Compensation Under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)' (1985) 9 Criminal law
Journal 98, 99.
13 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1967 (NSW).
14 See Freckelton, above nIl, 32.
15 See Fairall, above n 12, 98.
16 New Zealand was the first in 1963: Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963 (NZ) followed by the
United Kingdom: Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963 (UK). The United States passed legislatior in
29 jurisdictions between 1965 and 1977 followed by Canada and some European countries: Debo 'ah
Carrow, Crime Victim Compensation (1980); David Miers, 'The Provision of Compensation for Victims
of Violent Crime in Europe' (1985) 10 Victimology 662.
17 Margaret Thornton, 'Neo-Iiberalism, Discrimination and the Politics of "Ressentiment'" (2000) 17(2) L:IW
in Context 8, I 1.
18 See Duff, 'The Measure of Criminal Injuries Compensation' above n 2,106.
19 See Thornton, above n 17, 10.
20 Cec Brahe, Review of the Victims Compensation Act (1993).
21 Ibid 15.
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awarding compensation for injury," replacing the previous discretionary
approach." The new scheme appended a schedule listing a range of body parts
and particular harms to those body parts, specifying amounts for each injury
depending on their perceived seriousness." The revamped scheme also
introduced an approved counselling scheme providing 20 hours of free
counselling to victims." The changes manifest in the VSRA demonstrated a shift
away from collective responsibility and the provision of compensation towards a
philosophy of individual responsibility and the rehabilitation of victims." The
changes were also driven by a desire to reduce the costs of the schemes"
although not at the expense of 'deserving' victims. One group of victims that was
placed in this category of deserving victims was sexual assault victims."
IV THE INTRODUCTION OF SEXUAL AS SAUL T PROVISIONS
Successive chairpersons of the New South Wales Victims Compensation
Tribunal recommended that specific sexual assault provisions be included in the
new scheme to address the particular needs of sexual assault victims.?? The call
was heeded and in 1996, the New South Wales scheme, the first to do so in
Australia, was expanded to include sexual assault provisions. It did so with the
incorporation of three levels of award in the schedule of injuries.
22 A tariff approach guides the judiciary in their calculation of an award for non-pecuniary loss with a table
of amounts to be awarded for particular specified injuries. Most workers compensation schemes use a
tariff model of awarding compensation. See also Sporting Injuries Insurance Act 1978 (NSW), which
adopts a tariff model. However, in criminal injuries compensation schemes in Australia only Queensland
and New South Wales have adopted a tariff approach.
23 A discretionary approach leaves the assessor to determine the amount of non-pecuniary award up to the
statutory maximum of the particular scheme. All criminal injuries compensations schemes in Australia,
other than New South Wales and Queensland, have adopted this model.
24 Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW) sch 1.
25 In 1998 the Victims Compensation Amendment Act 1998 (NSW) widened the counselling provisions so
that victims who had suffered an injury within the meaning of s 5 but not a 'compensable injury' within
the meaning of s 7 could still access counselling services.
26 See New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 15 May 1996, 974 (Jeff Shaw,
Attorney-General). The Attorney-General identified the principal aims of the new scheme as follows:
to place greater emphasis upon the rehabilitation of victims of violent crime, through the provision of
appropriate counselling: to ensure that awards of compensation are directed toward those victims
suffering the most serious injuries; and to address the escalating costs of the scheme such that the
genuine needs of victims are met at a reasonable cost to the community.
In 2000, the Victims Compensation Amendment Act 2000 (NSW) was passed changing the name of the
New South Wales Act to the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 2000 (NSWj (removing the term
'compensation' and replacing it with 'support and rehabilitation').
27 New South Wales Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, First Interim Report: Alternative
Means of Providing for the Needs of Victims of Crime (1997) 9.
28 See the statements in New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, IS May 1996, 976,
977 (Jeff Shaw, Attorney-General).
29 New South Wales Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, Report. Inquiry into Psychological
Shock (1999) 16.
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Category One Indecent assault or assault with 57500 to SID 000 30
violence in the course of attempted
unlawful sexual intercourse.
Category Two Unlawful sexual intercourse or the SID 000 to S25 000
infliction of serious bodily injury in
the course of attempted unlawful
intercourse.
Category Three A pattern of abuse involving category 525 000 to S50 000
one or two sexual assault; unlawful
sexual intercourse in which serious
bodily injury is inflicted; unlawful
sexual intercourse in which two or
more offenders are involved; or
unlawful sexual intercourse in which
the offender uses an offensive
weapon.
The provisions changed the way the New South Wales scheme compensates
victims of sexual abuse. The previous scheme had used a victim-centred
approach to awarding compensation. The term 'victim-centred' refers to an
approach that assesses compensation on the basis of the severity of the injuries
suffered by the victim." Victims had typically submitted reports from medical
experts documenting the injuries they had suffered and compensation was
awarded according to the level of harm to the individual, determined by an
assessor on a discretionary basis up to a maximum of $50 000. The new scheme
however adopted an offence-based approach to compensating victims of sexual
abuse. This approach assessed the amount of compensation on the basis of the
criminal seriousness of the perpetrator's conduct, rather than on the severity of
individual victim's injuries.'? Thus, each of the three levels of award in the VSRA
accord with similar categories present in the criminal law, and the award range
increases in line with the perceived increase in criminal seriousness. A victim of
an indecent assault, for example, using the sexual assault provisions can only
receive compensation in the $7500-$10 000 range regardless of the severity of
the injuries because indecent assault is considered less 'criminally' serious than
unlawful sexual intercourse, which is a Category Two offence. This apprc ach
means that sexual assault victims are treated differently than they were under the
previous scheme and differently from other victims of crime who are still
assessed using a victim-centred approach. Sexual assault victims (and domestic
violence victims) are the only categories of victims in the new scheme to which
an offence-based formula is applied to calculate the amount of award.
The introduction of the sexual assault provisions in the New South Wales
scheme in 1996 created uncertainty and confusion on several fronts amongst
30 Note that the range in Category One was initially $2500-$10 000 but the threshold was raised in 2000 to
$7500: Victims Compensation Amendment (Compensable Injuries) Regulation 2000 (NSW) sch I.
31 See Duff. above n 2, 133 who uses the terms victim-centred and offence-based to describe similar
approaches to awarding compensation in the English jurisdiction.
32 Ibid.
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practitioners, academics and tribunal assessors alike.f Three main concerns
arose; first, did the introduction of an offence-based approach and the
categorisation of sexual assault as a 'compensable injury' in the schedule of
injuries remove the requirement to provide proof of injury? Second, once the
relevant 'sexual assault' band range is selected, the assessor has discretion to
determine the precise figure to award within that band. No guidance was
provided however on how the assessor should determine the amount within the
prescribed range. Two possibilities appeared viable: the assessor could either
equate the amount of award with the severity of 'harm' flowing from the relevant
offences; or determine the amount of award based on the perceived 'criminal
seriousness' of the sexual offences leading to the claim. Finally, if there was a
requirement to provide proof of injury, could injury be inferred from the inherent
invasive nature of sexual offences without the need for medical evidence? The
opportunity to resolve these issues and provide clarity of process for victims of
sexual assault presented itself in the case of GM
V HOW THE SEXUAL ASSAUL T PROVISIONS WERE
INTERPRETED
In the District Court proceedings of GM Sidis J articulated two central legal
issues that required resolution. Does the new scheme require victims of sexual
assault to provide proof of injury? And, if proof of injury is required, can it be
satisfied with proof of the offences themselves on the basis that the nature of the
offence creates a presumption of injury? The following two sections overview
the reasoning in both the District Court and the Court of Appeal in relation to
these two issues.
A Is Proof oflnjury Required?
1 Key Statutory Requirements
The outcome in both the District Court and the Court of Appeal in relation to
whether sexual assault victims must provide proof of injury, hinged on the
interpretation of ss 5, 6 and 7 of the VSRA, and their relationship to the sexual
assault provisions contained in the appended schedule of injuries. The three
sections set out the initial criteria for determining whether an applicant is eligible
for compensation and an appended schedule contains the list of injuries that are
compensable under the scheme. Section 6 provides that a primary victim of an
act of violence is eligible for statutory compensation.
Sections 5 and 7 provide definitions of a primary victim and an act of
violence. An act of violence is defmed in s 5 as an act, or series of related acts:
(a) that has apparently occurred in the course of the commissionof an offence, and
(b) that has involved violent conduct against one or more persons, and
33 See Forster, above n 3; New South Wales Combined Community Legal Centres, above n 3.
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(c) that has resulted in injury or death to one or more ofthose persons.
A primary victim of an act of violence is defined in s 7 as a person who
receives a compensable injury or dies, as a direct result of that act. A primary
victim of sexual assault must therefore have received an injury to satisfy the
requirement for an act of violence in s 5 as well as a compensable injury to
satisfy s 7.
Injury is defined in the dictionary section as 'actual physical bodily harm' or
'psychological or psychiatric injury'. Compensable injury is defined in the
dictionary section as those injuries contained in the appended schedule of
injuries. Sexual assault is listed in the schedule of injuries (alongside ot.ier
injuries such as bone fractures and loss of hearing) and is specifically defined as
'the compensable injury of sexual assault' . The key issue therefore in
determining the initial eligibility of the five children was whether proof of sexial
assault, defined as a compensable injury in the schedule and therefore satisfying s
7, also satisfied the requirement for an injury in s 5 in the absence of medical
evidence.
2 Reasoning of the District Court
The District Court found in favour of the five child applicants. Judge Sidis
concluded that victims of sexual assault are required to provide proof of one of
the sexual offences listed in the scheme but are not required to provide proof of
injury. Judge Sidis held that the term 'injury' in s 5 and the term 'compensable
injury' in s 7 are interchangeable and since sexual assault is characterised as a
'compensable injury' in the schedule, the requirement for an 'injury' in s 5 is
satisfied by the proof of a sexual assault.
In arriving at her conclusion, Sidis J made the following points. She
acknowledged that the guidelines on the VSRA issued by the Tribunal did Lot
accord with her own findings since they state that proof of injury is required in
instances of sexual assault. However, she found that the guidelines must be
consistent with the Act and that the guidelines do not in themselves define or
determine the meaning of the Act. In support of her proposition she further stated
that there were several indications in the VSRA that sexual assault victims were to
be dealt with differently to other victims of crime. She suggested that the reason
the legislature had removed the requirement for sexual assault victims to provide
proof of injury was either because sexual assaults 'are so abhorrent that victims
of those offences should be eligible for compensation as a matter of right' or
alternatively, 'that victims of such crimes are presumed to have suffered injury
by reason of the experiences to which they have been exposed'i>'
3 Reasoning of the Appeal Court
The Court of Appeal adopted a very different approach. In contrast to Sidis J
the judges concluded that sexual assault victims are required to provide proof of
injury. They held that 'injury' in s 5 and 'compensable injury' in s 7 are not
34 GM v Victims Compensation Fund (Unreported, Sidis J, 18 June 2003) 9.
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interchangeable terms. The judges held that the meanings and purposes of the
two terms are different and explained the difference in the following terms: the
requirement in s 5 for an injury is a threshold test, which all victims of crime,
including sexual assault victims, must satisfy. To satisfy the s 5 test, all victims
must provide proof of an injury as it is defined in the dictionary section (actual
physical harm or psychological injury). Once the s 5 test for injury is satisfied,
the assessor must then tum to the schedule of compensable injuries to see if the
injury is serious enough to warrant compensation. The court concluded that the
'compensable injuries' listed in the schedule are the kind of 'serious' injuries
which result in compensation and not all injuries that meet the s 5 test will meet
the more onerous requirements of the schedule.
Further, although sexual assault is explicitly termed a 'compensable injury' in
the schedule, the judges did not agree that this meant that proof of a sexual
assault established a compensable injury unless there was medical proof of a
consequential injury. Instead, the judges characterised the words in the schedule
as 'infelicitly expressed'35 and surmised that what the legislature had intended
was to provide a single award for one or more offences and their consequential
injuries, rather than a series of different amounts for different injuries. The judges
contended that if the act of sexual assault is itself considered an injury then any
victim would be automatically entitled to the initial amount of the relevant award
range (which they implied would be unworkable) and the assessor would be left
without a formula to calculate the amount of award in the range. While the
plaintiffs argued that assessors could ascertain the amount to be awarded with
reference to the nature of the offence; the judges however remained unconvinced
and held that this would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.
The Court of Appeal primarily relied on two key factors in reaching its
conclusion. First, statutory provision of compensation for victims of crime,
which dates back to the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), has always required proof of
injury. Second, the VSRA was passed in a climate of cut-backs and was intended
as limiting legislation. This is clearly evidenced, they maintained, by
parliamentary discussion in Hansard prior to the introduction of the Act and key
Joint Select Committee Reports published after the introduction of the Act. Both
sources, the judges held, emphasise the cost-cutting intent of the legislature.
Further, both points, the judges suggest, lead to the conclusion that the removal
of the requirement to provide proof of injury was not the intent of the legislature.
B Does the Nature of Sexual Assault in itself Prove Injury?
The second issue before the two courts was whether, if proof of injury is
required by the VSRA, what constitutes proof of injury in instances of sexual
assault? Judge Sidis held that even if proof of injury is required by the Act, the
five applicants had satisfied that requirement on the basis that the nature of the
assaults they had each suffered provided evidence of proof of injury. Judge Sidis
35 GM[2004] NSWCA 185 (Unreported, Mason P, Ipp lA, McColl JA, 16 June 2004) [115].
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stated: 'what was done to these children involved actual physical ccntact
amounting to harm or injury which was more than merely transient or trifling' .36
The Court of Appeal found, in contrast to Sidis J, that proof of injury had not
been established by the five applicants. The judges held that Sidis J had assumed
that physical contact in the course of a sexual assault 'amounted to harm or injury
that was more than trifling',37 This conclusion they claimed was 'manifestly
wrong' and an 'erroneous application of the authorities"." Instead, physical
contact must result in hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the healtl and
comfort of the victim and this must be established with the provision of evidence.
Although Sidis J had concluded that proof of the offences themselves sufficed to
prove that injury or hurt had occurred, the Court of Appeal concluded that, ii the
absence of medical evidence, this was not established by the applicants.
VI CRITIQUING THE COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION
AND ALTERNATE APPROACHES
A Reasoning of the Court of Appeal: A Critique
The Court of Appeal held that not every injury that satisfies the requirement in
s 5 for an injury will result in compensation. Indeed, the court concluded that
only more serious and persistent injuries are listed in the schedule and are
compensable. Although the judges did not provide an explanation for why an
injury might satisfy s 5 but not be included in the schedule of compensable
injuries it is likely, as the Court of Appeal suggests, that this is the intent of the
legislature and that 'injury' and 'compensable injury' are not interchangeable
terms. This is due to the new scheme providing counselling, but not
compensation, for injured victims who have not suffered a 'serious' compensable
injury. Such a concession in the new scheme is in line with its 'rehabilitation'
ethos." For example, a victim of an assault who receives minor bruising and
temporary shock would be entitled to free counselling but not a compensatory
award since the injuries suffered do not equate to any ofthe serious injuries listed
in the schedule.
However, although the legislature may have intended that satisfaction of t'ie s
5 meaning of 'injury' will not equate to the satisfaction of the requirement for a
'compensable injury' as specified in s 7 (and therefore result in a compensation
award) an injury listed as a 'compensable injury' in the schedule would surely
satisfy the requirement for an injury in s 5, since in the judges own words, the
schedule of compensable injuries represents the 'most serious injuries for which
the state considers compensation should be paid' .40 The reasoning hinges
therefore on whether the terminology used in the schedule which defines sexual
36 GM v Victims Compensation Fund (Unreported, Sidis J, 18 June 2003) 11.
37 GM[2004] NSWCA 185 (Unreported, Mason P, lpp JA, McColl JA, 16 June 2004) [135].
38 Ibid [137].
39 See discussion in above n 25.
40 GM [2004] NSWCA 185 (Unreported, Mason P, Ipp JA, McColl lA, 16 June 2004) [120].
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assault as a 'compensable injury' means that proof of a sexual assault itself
without further proof of injury satisfies the requirement in s 7 for a compensable
injury. The judges held that it does not.
H is illustrative to follow the reasoning of the Court of Appeal through to the
resulting outcomes. If s 5 requires proof of an injury (actual bodily harm and/or
psychological injury) consequential on a sexual assault, what degree of severity
of injury is required? If the victim of a sexual assault has suffered minor bruising,
cuts or anxiety and provided medical evidence, would this be sufficient to satisfy
the requirement for an injury under s 5? If so when such a victim proceeds to the
sexual assault provisions and is placed in the relevant category of award based on
the nature of the offence they have experienced, would they automatically
receive the base amount? That line of reasoning would mean that whilst the 5
children in the case at hand remain uncompensated because they have provided
no medical evidence, any person who provided evidence of any minor injury
such as bruising, cuts or anxiety, provided the injury was not 'not trifling and
transient', would receive compensation at the level of the relevant award range,
based on the criminal seriousness of the sexual offence. This does not appear to
accord with a 'common-sense' outcome.
Alternatively, the judicial reasoning might suggest that, having satisfied s 5,
the sexual assault provisions can only be accessed upon proof of one of the other
compensable injuries in the schedule. However, the offence-based category
would then amount to an extra hurdle not faced by other victims of crime
(narrowing the range of sexual offences that can constitute an act of violence and
restricting the amount of award based on the criminal seriousness of the offence
rather than the severity of injury). This would not amount to a benefit for victims
and it is unlikely that this was the intent of the legislature. Further, in situations
where the award amount of the injury suffered by the victim in the schedule is
less than the base amount of the relevant category of sexual assault, the applicant
can elect to receive the increased amount and in that way 'benefit' from the
sexual assault provisions. This approach however seems to suggest that the
injuries of sexual assault victims are worth more than the same injuries suffered
by victims of other crimes. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal therefore, when
scrutinised, fails to resolve the uncertainties that have plagued the sexual assault
provisions since their inception.
B Statutory Interpretation, Extrinsic Sources and the
Context of Sexual Ahuse
The schedule of the VSRA expressly states that sexual assault is a compensable
injury. Despite this, the Court of Appeal concluded that the phrase 'the
compensable injury of sexual assault' does not mean that sexual assault is a
compensable injury. The Court held that to qualify as a compensable injury,
sexual assault must be accompanied by consequential injury that is proven with
medical evidence. This interpretation of the VSRA calls for further analysis. The
standard approach to statutory interpretation in New South Wales is the
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purposive approach." As Parkinson puts it, the ordinary meaning of the words of
an Act should be 'discerned from its context in the Act as a whole and in light of
the purposes that the Act was designed to achieve' .42 Extrinsic materials
(Hansard, law reform reports, other committee reports, and explanatory
memoranda), if published prior to the enactment of the Act in question," m ay be
used to 'confirm the ordinary meaning of a legislative provision or to determine
the meaning where the provision is ambiguous or obscure' .44
In determining whether sexual assault is a compensable injury, the Court of
Appeal sought to ascertain if the legislative intent differed from the 'ordinary'
meaning of the words in the statute. It did this by examining selected extrinsic
and other sources. The judges considered statements recorded in Hansard and a
report from the NSW Joint Select Committee on Criminal Injuries
Compensation" to determine the purpose of the legislation. They concluded after
consideration of these sources that the VSRA was limiting legislation designed to
curtail state liability to victims of crime generally. The judges used this position
to support a number of their findings and to favour an interpretation 0:0 the
provisions that results in 'limiting' claims by victims of sexual abuse.
Parliamentary discussion in Hansard and statements in the NSW Joint Select
Committee Reports do support the judges' conclusion that the Act was intended
to limit claims by victims of crime. However, the debates in Hansard also
support the proposition that the sexual assault provisions were intended to ease
access to compensatory redress for victims and to overcome some of the
historical and contextual difficulties faced by these 'deserving' victims." Fur:her,
the Joint Select Committee Reports support the contention that the sexual assault
provisions were intended to remove the requirement to provide proof of injury as
illustrated in the following instances. The Committee stated in December 1997
(after the changes were introduced), that 'sexual assault is divided into three
categories and an award range is provided for victims, which is determned
according to the nature and pattern of offence. There is no requirement to provide
proof of a certain level of psychological injury' .47 In a subsequent Report in
41 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 33.
42 Patrick Parkinson, Tradition and Change in Australian Law (2'" ed, 2001) 209.
43 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 34(2)(e).
44 See Parkinson, above n 42,210.
45 The Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation was established after the introduction of the VSRA
to review the changes that had been made to criminal injuries compensation. The three publication; that
ensued from the Committee and referred to by the Court of Appeal are not extrinsic sources within the
meaning of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) since they were published after the passing of the VS'RA.
Nevertheless one of the Reports was utilised by the NSW Court of Appeal in their reasoning. Joint Select
Committee on Victims Compensation, Second Interim Report: The Long Term Financial Viability of the
Victims Compensation Fund (1997). Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, Report: lncuiry
into Psychological Shock, above n 29; Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, Report:
Ongoing Issues Concerning the NSW Victims Compensation Scheme (2000).
46 When the Bill was presented to parliament for its final reading, Jeff Shaw stated that 'the categories of
sexual assault in the schedule have been introduced to recognise the particular needs of this group of
victims': New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 15 May 1996, 976 (Jeff Shaw,
Attorney-General). See also Brahe, above n 20, 18, 21, 41.
47 See Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, Second Interim Report, above n 45, 44.
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1998, the Select Committee stated that victims of sexual assault are not required
'to prove that they have a psychological injury in terms of nervous shock or
mental illness'." Finally in February 2000, the Joint Select Committee made its
most compelling statement to date with an express assertion that proof of injury
is no longer required:
There were also two 'protected' categories introduced into the scheme: homicide
and sexual assault. Victims who fall within either of these categories are no longer
required to provide proof of injury .... Victims of sexual assault are paid according
to the severity of crime perpetrated against them. The major purpose of introducing
these categories was to alleviate the pressure on victims who had suffered a very
serious injury to prepare forms and present medical certificates. The fact that
victims have ... suffered a sexual assault is seen as proof enough of the right of
compensation. Further, by waiving the requirement to show proof of injury claims
should be expedited through the administrative process, therefore not unnecessarily
prolonging victims suffering."
In addition, a statement by Dr Elms (former Chairman of the NSW Victims
Compensation Tribunal) prior to the introduction of the VSRA lends weight to the
views expressed by the Joint Select Committee. Dr Elms stated that the
legislation (as it then operated) inappropriately forced victims of sexual assault
'to prove that something is wrong with them ... To my mind this is a classic case
where compensation should be awarded for the traumatic experience itself rather
than having to prove to a difficult standard the results of that experience' .50
The statements by the Joint Select Committee and Dr Elms, whilst not
extrinsic sources within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW),
provide compelling evidence of the policy position of the NSW legislature. The
statements clearly support the conclusion that the intent of the legislature was to
improve access to compensation for victims of sexual assault and to remove some
of the historical and contextual disadvantage faced by victims in meeting the
requirements of the scheme. Where provisions have been introduced to redress
historical disadvantages faced by a marginalised group, the court should in
interpreting those provisions consider the 'context of the history of oppression
experienced by the group to which the person before the court belongs'. 51 As the
Canadian academic Majury explains, 'the social, economic and legal inequalities
currently faced by the group are additional and important pieces of the general
context.v The 'context' of historical and ongoing disadvantage experienced by
victims of sexual abuse in Australia, particularly in their interactions with the
legal system, includes the following.
Research indicates that sexual abuse is prevalent in Australian society across
all ages, cultures and socio-economic classes, predominantly experienced by
48 See Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, above n 29, 8.
49 Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, Report: Ongoing Issues Concerning the NSW Victims
Compensation Scheme (2000) 9.
50 Dr E Elms (Seminar on Criminal Compensation Claims, 1992), cited in Joint Select Committee on
Victims Compensation, above n 29, 16.
51 See Majury, above n 5, 417. See also Morgan, above n 5.
52 See Majury, above n 5, 417.
2005 Opportunity Lost: In Search of Justice for Victims of Sexual Assault 771
women and children and primarily perpetrated by men. 53 Victims have
historically encountered difficulty in accessing both the criminal and the civil
system, as illustrated by the low conviction rates in the criminal justice system>'
and by a dearth of successful cases in the common law tort system." In
particular, research has indicated that criminal injuries compensation schemes
have historically disadvantaged sexual abuse victims because: the secrecy and
shame, generated in part by societal and police attitudes, that continues to
surround sexual abuse hinders victims from reporting the abuse and looging
claims," because many victims are unaware that the injuries they suffer have
resulted from the abuse'? and because the process of verifying both the sexual
assault and the injuries that result can be traumatic and often involves reliving
and re-experiencing the abuse.f
In addition to suggesting that the provisions were introduced to address
historical disadvantages faced by victims of sexual abuse in accessing the
scheme, the Reports expressly posit that the means adopted by the legislature to
redress those disadvantages was the removal of the requirement to provide proof
of injury. The Court of Appeal in its decision implied that the removal 0:0 the
requirement to provide proof of injury would lead to an increase in
unsubstantiated claims. However, research suggests that removing the
requirement to provide proof of injury would do little to affect the legitimacy of
claims since sexual abuse typically causes devastating harm. As Millhouse J puts
it succinctly: 'Almost every rape ... is harmful and dreadful; that is in the nature
ofthe crime although the circumstances of some are worse than others' .59 Typical
effects in both adult and child victims include low self-esteem, feeling, of
isolation and alienation, major depression, inability to relate to others, or to .rust
53 The Australian Bureau of Statistics recorded that, on a national level, 15 630 sexual assaults were
reported to authorities in 2000. They also recorded that 79% of the victims who reported a sexual assault
were female and that 99 per cent of the offenders were male: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Recorded
Crime (2000). The Report covered the period from I January 2000 to 31 December 2000.
54 See Julie Stubbs. 'Sexual Assault, Criminal Justice and Law and Order' (2003) Practice and Prevention:
Contemporary Issues in Adult Sexual Assault in NSW <http://www.agd.nsw.gov.au/cpd.nsf/> at 6
November 2005.
55 There has not been in Australia the surge of litigation in the tort of battery seen in the Canadian
jurisdiction: see Bruce Feldthusen, 'The Canadian Experiment with the Civil Action for Sexual Battery'
in Nick Mullany (ed) Torts in the Nineties (1997) 274. However see also the successful case of W GI'd W;
Rand G (by their next friend P) (Intervener) (1994) 17 FLR 751, in which two girls successfully sued
their stepfather in battery for sexual abuse and received $97 000 and $80 000 respectively for pain and
suffering, emotional shock, post traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depression. See also Paten v Bale
[1999] QSC 317 (Unreported, Wilson J, 19 October 1999) where the plaintiff successfully Sl ed a
neighbour in battery for sexual abuse over a two year period between the ages of seven and nine She
suffered chronic post traumatic stress disorder. chronic depressive disorder, sexual aversion disorde: and
an unspecified personality disorder and was awarded a total of $183282 including $120 000 for f rture
economic loss.
56 Christine Forster. 'The Failure of Criminal Injuries Compensation Schemes for Victims of Intra-Far ulial
Abuse: The Example of Queensland' (2002) 10(2) Torts Law Journal 143, 150.
57 See Julia Cabassi and Amanda George, 'Remembering Childhood: Time Limitations the Hurdle for
Childhood Sexual Assault Survivors Seeking Compensation' (1993) 18(6) Alternative Law Journal 286,
288.
58 See Jarvis and McIlwaine, above n 7.
59 See P v South Australia (1992) 60 A Crim R 286. 290.
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others particularly persons in authority.s? difficulties with interpersonal and
sexual relationships" guilt, self-hatred, denial, repression, disassociation and
amnesia.s- drug addictions, suicidal behaviour, and eating disorders-' and
vocational and educational setbacks.v' Although not affecting the legitimacy of
claims, the removal of the requirement to provide proof of injury would however
provide considerable relief for victims from the potentially traumatic process of
psychiatric assessment (which may involve re-living the experience and the
shame that victims typically experience); it would enable claims to proceed more
efficiently through the system reducing the potential damage caused by delay;
and it would provide access to the scheme for larger numbers of injured victims
who are deterred from lodging claims because of the requirement for medical or
psychological assessment.
In confining their analysis to the narrow parameters of statutory interpretation,
the judges failed to consider key statements in the Joint Select Committee
Reports, the literature that documents the history of disadvantage faced by
victims of sexual abuse, and the literature that documents the harms typically
experienced by victims of sexual abuse. Reference to those sources could have
provided an understanding of the historical and ongoing discrimination that had
prompted the introduction of the sexual assault provisions which were being
interpreted. It could also have revealed the unnecessary nature of a requirement
to provide medical evidence of injury. Despite this and the statements in the
Reports, the Court of Appeal persisted in its conclusion that the legislature did
not intend to remove proof of injury for sexual assault victims.
C Considering Tort Law
In determining firstly the meaning of ss 5, 6 and 7 and secondly their
relationship with the sexual assault provisions, the Court of Appeal relied on two
key propositions. First, the judges looked to the history of the schemes to assert
that criminal injuries compensation schemes in New South Wales have always
required proof of injury and concluded that it was unlikely that the legislature
intended to change the status quo. Second, the judges stated that if the
requirement to provide proof of injury was removed, there would be no clear
formula for assessors to determine the precise amount in the award range.
However, when situated within the broader context of tort law, where criminal
injuries compensation schemes had their genesis, both propositions have the
potential to produce different outcomes to those arrived at by the judges.
Since their inception, criminal injuries compensation schemes in New South
Wales have required applicants to provide proof of injury before a successful
60 See Judith Cohen and Anthony Mannarino. above n 6; Einbender and Friedrich, above n 6.
61 See Paul Mullen and Jillian Fleming, 'Long Term Effects of Child Sexual Abuse' (1998) 9 Issues in
Child Abuse Prevention <http://www.aifs.gov.au/nchlissues9.htm1> at 6 November 2005; Finkelhor et ai,
above n 6.
62 See Judith Herman, Father, Daughter Incest (1981).
63 S E Romans et aI, 'Sexual Abuse in Childhood and Deliberate Self-Harm' (1995) 152 American Journal
of Psychiatry 1336.
64 Chaffin, Wherry and Dykman, above n 6.
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claim can ensue. The Court of Appeal contended that since the legislation was
intended to be limiting, it was unlikely that the legislature would have removed
the requirement which, the judges argued, had the potential to lead to more
claims rather than less. They further asserted that to remove the requirement to
provide proof of injury would have been an unusual and extraordinary move
'inimical to the concept of a compensation scheme' .65 It is not however an
extraordinary or unusual premise in the broader context of tort law, where proof
of injury has never been a requirement in the tort of battery, the primary action
for a direct physical invasion to person or property. The rationale underscoring
battery and the other trespass torts is that the invasion of personal integrity is a
wrong in itself that should be recognised by an award of damages.w Although an
award in such circumstances is nominal (a token award not intender. to
compensate the victim for their actual injuriesj'" and whilst it could be argued
that the base amounts in the three award bands are more substantial than a
'token' award, the amounts are nevertheless small in comparison to the
devastating harms that sexual assault typically causes. Indeed, some have argued
that the amounts provided by criminal injuries compensation schemes are merely
a 'solatium' primarily aimed at providing an acknowledgement by the state ofthe
wrong. It is therefore not an 'unprincipled' or 'unprecedented' step, out of line
with the basic tenets of compensation law, for the legislature to take the view that
compensation should be awarded to victims in recognition of the 'abhorrent'
wrong and the invasion of personal integrity inherent in a sexual assault, without
the need to provide medical evidence of injury.
The second rationale offered by the judges in support oftheir position is pcsed
in the question: if historically the severity of an injury has determined the amount
of compensation awarded, and if proof of injury is no longer required, bow
would assessors determine the appropriate amount in the award range? That
question is easily answered with reference to tort law. To receive an amount of
compensation for the invasion of personal integrity in any of the trespass torts, a
plaintiff does not have to provide proof of injury. To be eligible for an amount
that compensates for the full extent of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, he or
she must provide proof ofthose injuries. There appears to be no plausible reason
why the VSRA could not operate in a similar manner. To receive the base amount
of compensation a plaintiff would have to provide proof of the invasion of
personal integrity, which would require proof of one of the sexual offences listed
in the dictionary section of the VSRA (and the plaintiff would not have to provide
proof of injury). To receive more than the base amount, the plaintiff would have
to provide proof of injury, as well as proof of a sexual offence, and compensation
would be awarded on a restitutionary basis to the maximum of the scheme. Based
on this reasoning, each of the five children in GM would have been entitled to the
base amount in the award range, in line with the nature of the offences they had
experienced. Three ofthe five child plaintiffs who were subjected to a 'pattern of
65 GM [2004] NSWCA 185 (Unreported, Mason P, Ipp JA, McColl JA, 16 June 2004) [126].
66 See Harold Luntz and David Hambly, Tort Cases and Commentary (5th ed, 2002) 87.
67 See Francis Trindade and Peter Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia (3rd ed, 1999) 23.
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abuse' would have qualified for a Category Three award and received the base
amount of $25 000. In the absence of any proof of injury no further award would
have been made.
D Looking to International Law
Two international conventions to which Australia is a signatory, the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ('CEDA W')
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child ('CROC') could have assisted the
judges in an interpretation of the VSRA that aligns with Australia's international
obligations. Although Australia is not bound by international conventions unless
they have been incorporated into domestic law, where a statute is capable of two
interpretations the courts should presume that parliament intended to legislate
consistently with any relevant international covenant to which it is a signatory."
CEDAW, known as the International Bill of Rights for Women.s? and ratified
by Australia in 1980, obligates members to protect the sexual integrity of women.
General Recommendation 19 specifically deals with sexual violence against
women and obligates member states to 'ensure that laws against family violence
and abuse, rape, sexual assault and other gender-based violence give adequate
protection to all women, and respects their integrity and dignity'.
Recommendation 19 also obligates members to provide appropriate protective
and support services for victims particularly penal sanctions, civil remedies and
compensatory provisions to protect women against all kinds of violence,
including sexual assault. CEDAW does not merely mandate a formal approach to
equality"? but rather compels member states to undertake measures designed to
achieve substantive equality.' I It does this by obligating member states to ensure
equality of opportunity, equality of access to those opportunities (sometimes in
the form of affirmative action measures) and, crucially, equality of results."
In the same way that CEDAW protects the sexual integrity of women, CROC,
ratified by Australia in 1990, protects the sexual integrity of children and
recommends the 'best interests' of the child as the paramount consideration in all
matters concerning children. Article 3 states that 'in all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
68 See Dennis Pearce and Robert Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (5th ed, 200 I) 66; See also
Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (2001) 98.
69 UN Division for the Advancement of Women <http://www/un/org/womenwatchldaw/cedaw> at 6
November 2005.
70 Formal equality is the requirement that legal rules should apply in the same way to all members of the
community regardless of sex, race, sexuality or any other characteristic. See Australian Law Reform
Commission, Equality Before the Law: Women's Equality, Report No 69 (1994) [3.8]. Research has
illustrated the limitations of fonnal equality to achieve actual equality for women.
71 Substantive equality refers to 'actual' equality: see Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman, Subversive Sites'
Feminist Engagements with Law in India (1996) 176.
72 See Rea Abuda Chongsun 'Non Discrimination and Gender Equality' (Presentation on behalf of
International Women's Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific (IWRAW-AP), given at the Regional
Consultations on the Interlinkages between Violence Against Women and Women's Right to Adequate
Housing, in Co-Operation with the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, New Delhi, India, 28-
31 October 2003).
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courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration' and Article 34 obligates State parties
to 'protect children from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse'.
The inclusion of sexual assault provisions by the New South Wales legislature
in the VSRA heralded a long awaited recognition of the historical disadvantages
faced by victims in accessing the scheme, particularly child victims. An
interpretation of the provisions to mean either that proof of injury is not recuired
or alternatively that sexual assault itself presumes the infliction of injury would
accord with the substantive 'equality of results' approach mandated by CEDAW.
It would achieve this by expressly acknowledging that victims of sexual assault
face burdens not experienced by victims of other crimes and it would also
legitimate an alternate application process that recognises those burdens and
eases access to compensation.
The removal of the requirement to provide proof of injury is also a measure in
the 'best interests' of child victims of sexual abuse, and therefore in line with
Australia's obligations under CROe, since it removes the risks of
retraumatisation associated with psychiatric and psychological assessmen: and
minimises the risk that delay will 'draw out' the trauma and further damage the
child victim.
Thus, the initial introduction of the sexual assault provisions was a move in
accord with Australia's international obligations, as it appeared firstly to
recognise and address the particular discrimination faced by victims of sexual
abuse and secondly, to fulfil the obligation to act in the best interests of child
victims. The decision of the Court of Appeal detracts from that interpretation and
entrenches the discrimination victims face.
VII THE IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS OF COURT OF
APPEAL'S FINDINGS
The decision of the Court of Appeal in GM will have far-reaching impacts
legally, economically and socially for victims of sexual abuse. These impacts are
not confined to victims of sexual abuse but will extend to their families and the
wider community.
First, although the intent of parliament was to create a more 'benevo ent'
framework for victims of sexual abuse, and although the Court of Appeal claims
its decision leaves that benevolent framework in place, in effect the potential of
the provisions to provide easier access to compensation has not been realised.
Second, the decision sends a symbolic message to the wider community that
sexual abuse is not seriously regarded by the state. Third, the potential of the
provisions to provide economic and therapeutic benefits to victims of sexual
abuse has been significantly frustrated. Finally, victims who choose to proceed
with an application risk retraumatisation whilst those who are deterred from
applying remain uncompensated. These impacts are discussed in detail below.
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A The VSRA: Benevolent or Benign
The Court of Appeal concluded that, despite their findings, the VSRA is
'benevolent' to victims of sexual assault. It is benevolent, according to the
judges, in two ways. First, the Act has extended the meaning of 'violent' conduct
to include instances of abuse which do not fall within an 'ordinary' meaning of
what constitutes violence. For example, under the new sexual assault provisions,
the definition of what constitutes sexual assault has been 'expanded' to include
events sueh as intercourse with consent obtained by means of a non-violent
threat. According to the Court of Appeal this means, that in instances where the
victim is induced into sexual acts by coercive means, such situations will still fall
within the meaning of an act of violence despite the absence of physical force. In
implying that this is a 'benevolent' development, the judges display a
fundamental misunderstanding of the inherent 'violence' of all sexual abuse
regardless of the circumstances. Further, courts in New South Wales and other
Australian jurisdictions have always adopted a broad interpretation of the concept
of 'violence' in sexual abuse cases heard under criminal injuries compensation
schemes and have not denied claims on the basis that the abuse resulted from a
process of 'grooming' and coercion rather than through physical force." The
sexual assault provisions therefore have not been benevolent in extending this
long established understanding of sexual violence, they have merely confined it
to the specific and limited categories contained in the dictionary section of the
VSRA.
Second, the judges claim that the VSRA gives victims of sexual assault the
'beneficial' choice of either lodging a claim using the sexual assault provisions or
the option of using the same victim-centred mode accessed by all other victims of
crime. However, the Court of Appeal's interpretation has not rendered the sexual
assault provisions an easier route for victims, but rather has imposed extra
hurdles. The scheme now requires the satisfaction of both an offence-based
component (where the applicant must fit within one of the three categories of
offences specified in the schedule and the award is constrained by that
categorisation) and a victim-centered component (proving to a medical standard
the presence of an injury). In sum, the decision in GM requires victims of sexual
assault to satisfy the same victim-centered criteria that other victims of crime
73 See, eg, C v BC; D v BC (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Murray J, 5 June 1997); R v
C [1982] 2 NSWLR 674; C v C (1993) 111 FLR 467; KAB v DJB [2000] Q SC 498 (Unreported,
Atkinson J, 22 December 2000); R v Tamcelik; Ex Parte Ozcan [1998] I Qld R 330; 'H', 'B', 'E'v
Crimes Compensation Tribunal [1997] 1 VR 608; 'E' v 'P ': 'T' v 'P' (Unreported, Supreme Court of
Western Australia, McKechnie J, 10 December 2001); 'F'v 'H' (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western
Australia, Nicholson J, 27 August 1992); 'J' v Petterson (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western
Australia, Scott J, 20 September 1994); Koman v Podirsky and the Undersecretary for Law (Unreported,
Supreme Court of Western Australia, Rowland J, 12 June 1991); 'L' v 'L' [1999] WA SC 262
(Unreported, McKechnie J, I November 1999); 'L' v 'W' (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western
Australia, Murray J, 22 April 1993); 'M' v ' J'; 'J'v 'J' (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western
Australia, Scott J, 4 November 1992); M v Hoogwerf [1998] WA SC 380 (Unreported, Miller J, 14
December 1998); 'McD' v Edwards (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Heenan J, 10
October 1997); '0' v 'J' (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Wallwork J, 13 February
1992); 'V'v 'W'; 'A' v 'W' (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Walsh J, 23 March 1993);
'X'v 'Y' (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Parker J, 13 September 1996),
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must satisfy, in addition to the extra requirements imposed by the offence-based
categories.
B The Symbolic Implications of Denying Compensation
The denial of compensation to the five child plaintiffs and the finding that
future applicants must provide, to a medical standard, proof that an injury has
occurred has significant symbolic implications. As the Brahe Report stated
'compensation is both an important formal acknowledgment on behalf of the
community that the injury and suffering were unjustly inflicted' and 'an
expression of support and concern by the community and government
authorities' .74 An effective system of state-funded compensation for victims of
sexual abuse provides a clear statement of the unacceptability of sexual abuse in
the community." Conversely, a system that is ineffective at compensating
victims sends a range of negative symbolic messages. These include the message
that sexual abuse is not regarded seriously by the state; that the wrongs that
sexual abuse victims experience are not injurious; and finally that sexual abuse is
not in itself an abhorrent harm that the state considers worthy of compensation.
C Retraumatising Victims
The five child applicants in GM did not lodge medical evidence of their
injuries. Evidence was not provided because their parents did not want them to be
subjected to retraumatisation through the process of psychiatric or psychological
assessment. The concerns of the parents are supported by research wl.ich
suggests that the process of psychiatric or psychological assessment nay
retraumatise victims of sexual assault and worsen the injuries they suffer.
Psychological counselling, which has therapeutic goals, and psycho log cal
assessment, which is a non-therapeutic tool aimed solely at assessing the leve of
injury, are vastly different in their impact. A psychological assessment for the
purpose of producing evidence for court proceedings involves a victim re-telling
their story and thereby reliving the trauma, shame and humiliation that is
typically experienced in instances of sexual abuse. The purpose of assessment is
not therapeutic and usually involves only one evaluation session without the
trust, relationship building, and long-term objective setting that characterises
therapeutic counselling. As Jarvis and McIlwaine explain: 'often assessment and
diagnosis occurs outside of any therapeutic process. This is problematic because
women often report an escalation of distress and feelings of being unsafe, a; a
result of retelling the abuse. This can represent yet another experience of
trauma' .76 The end result of this process can be the worsening of the level of
injury and trauma, particularly in child victims.
74 See Brahe, above n 20, 13.
75 See Nora West, 'Rape in the Criminal Law and the Victim's TOr! Alternative: A Feminist Analysis'
(1988) 50(1) Toronto Faculty of Law Review 96, 98. See also Jennifer Temkin, Rape and the Legal
Process (2nd ed, 2002) 347.
76 See Jarvis and Mcllwaine, above n 7, 148.
778 UNSW Law Journal Volume 28(3)
The decision of the Court of Appeal has established that this potentially
harmful process is now integral to an application for criminal injuries
compensation by sexual assault victims. The implications of this are two-fold:
some victims may be subjected to assessment despite the risks ofretraumatisation
and worsening of injury, whilst others may be deterred from lodging claims.
Those that are deterred will remain uncompensated and the wrong they have
suffered will remain unacknowledged. Both outcomes are the antithesis of the
expressly stated purpose of the new legislation 'to provide support and
rehabilitation for victims of crimes and violence"."
D Lost Economic and Therapeutic Benefits
The therapeutic and economic benefits that potentially flow from a
compensatory award to victims of sexual abuse are considerable. In GM the five
child applicants were denied the economic and therapeutic benefits an award of
compensation would have afforded.
Economic benefits include the means to obtain counselling (the 5 applicants
will not be entitled to the free counselling under the Act since s 5, according to
the judges has not been satisfied), the possibility of future studies to address the
loss of educational and consequential career opportunities the children are likely
to experience, and the opportunity to make positive life changes such as moving
away from the place of abuse." Further, the five children may have received
therapeutic benefits as a result of the public acknowledgment of the abuse by the
state. As Dr Sandra Hacker puts it: 'The symbolic recognition of the validity of
the victim's experience provides reassurance to victims that the legal system and
the community cares about their pain. This reassurance and recognition assists in
the patient's recovery' .79 For a victim of sexual abuse, an acknowledgment that
what happened is not her or his fault and that someone in authority is prepared to
believe her or him can offer an important new perspective and can facilitate
closure for the victim. As Herman puts it:
Restoration of the breach between the traumatized person and the community
depends, first, upon public acknowledgement of the traumatic event and, second,
upon some form of community action. Once it is publicly recognized that a person
has been harmed, the community must take action to assign responsibility for the
harm and to repair the injury. These two responses - recognition and restitution -
are necessary to rebuild the survivor's sense of order and justice.80
VIII CONCLUSION
The sexual assault provisions in the VSRA, introduced in the context of
conflicting policy objectives, sought on the one hand to limit claims by victims
77 See Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act1996 (NSW) s 3(a) ('Objects of the Act').
78 See Freckelton, 'Compensating the Sexually Abused', above n 7,196.
79 Quoted in Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 21 November 1996, 1454 (John
Thwaites).
80 Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (1992) 70.
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of crime whilst on the other hand easing access to compensatory redress for
victims of sexual assault. The predominant means of achieving a more accessible
scheme for victims of sexual assault was through the introduction of a discrete set
of offence-based provisions, which, this note has argued, removed the
requirement to provide proof of injury. The removal of the requirement to
provide proof of injury would have reduced the arduous nature of the application
process and would have reduced the potential for the retraumatisation of victims
by removing the need for psychiatric assessment. It would also have facilitated
the expeditious processing of claims thereby avoiding 'drawing out' the trauma
of victims. Central to the objectives of providing an efficient, effective and
sensitive means of compensating victims of sexual assault was a recognition of
the 'inherent' harm of sexual abuse. As Sidis J puts it, it is an inherent harm
because of its 'abhorrent nature' and also because of the long-term devastating
impact that research suggests victims of sexual abuse typically suffer. Inadequate
drafting however coupled with a conservative approach by the Court of Appeal
frustrated those objectives.
The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in GM therefore is an
opportunity lost. On the one hand, an opportunity lost to realise the potent.al of
the sexual assault provisions in providing an efficient, effective and therapeutic
model of compensation for victims of sexual abuse. On the other hand, it is an
opportunity lost by the State of New South Wales to lead by example and
provide a symbolic message to other jurisdictions of the seriousness with wh.ch it
regards sexual abuse. Sexual abuse victims and their advocates are left with little
choice but to rally yet again for the gains they had already made, but have now
lost.
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